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ABSTRACT 
We investigate the effects of higher tariffs on the current account. 
Tariffs may increase or decrease investment depending on the capital intensity 
of the sector protected. We find that the response of saving to tariffs is 
sensitive to the modelling of saving behavior·. ·In a model in which consumers' 
discount rate varies endogenously (in the Uzawa preference form), saving falls 
with higher tariffs. This result may, however, be reversed in the 
Blanchard-Yaari type model in which consumers have uncertain lifetimes. We 
find that in both models the response of saving depends on a production 
distortion effect which changes steady-state income and an effect on 
steady-state expenditures. 
Charles Engel and Kenneth Kletzer, "Tariffs, Saving and the Current Account" 
Tariffs, Saving, and the Current Account* 
Tariffs are frequently proposed as a policy to reduce or eliminate 
current account deficits. This paper explores the effectiveness of those 
policies for a small country in the context of a two-sector neoclassical 
growth model. We find it less insightful to examine the current account when 
written in its net exports form. A naive analysis leads one to conclude that 
since tariffs reduce imports, there must be a tendency to improve the current 
account. This is a very partial equilibrium viewpoint that ignores 
adjustments throughout the economy. In static neoclassical trade models (in 
which the current account is zero by assumption) shifts in production and 
consumption patterns ensure that any reduction in imports is matched by an 
equal drop in exports. In a large class of macroeconomic models with flexible 
exchange rates the tariff also has no impact on the current account, because 
an exchange rate appreciation will immediately offset all changes from higher 
tariffs. To understand the long run consequences of tariff policies, we want 
to consider the components of the current account in its saving less 
investment form. This-allows us to see clearly that if a tariff is to r~duce 
a current account deficit it must have the effect of decreasing the country•s 
international borrowing. 
We concentrate mainly on how tariffs change the level of saving. The 
response of saving is found to be sensitive to the specific modelling of 
saving behavior. In particular, we compare saving behavior in two popular 
intertemporal optimizing models of small open economies - the endogenous 
discount rate approach of Uzawa (1968) (which has been taken in the 
international context by Obstfeld (1981, 1982) among others) and the uncertain 
lifetime model of Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965). In some respects, the 
saving functions derived from these models are quite similar. Both assume 
that savers maximize utility over an i nfi ni te hori zo~, and both generate 
•This paper contains elements of a study that was prepared for the 
AEI/NBER pre-conference on Real and Financial Linkages in Open Economies, June 
1985. We would like to thank Dani Rodrik and Jonathan Eaton for useful 
comments. 
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Metzlerian saving equations in which the•level of saving is proportional to 
the difference between some target level of wealth and current wealth. Yet, 
the response of national saving to tariffs can be quite different in the two 
formulations. The target wealth level will change according to two effects 
that we identify - a steady-state expenditure effect and a production 
distortion effect. The distortion effect always works to increase saving when 
tariff levels rise. In the Uzawa-type model tariffs also increase saving 
through the expenditure effect, in contrast to the uncertain lifetime model in 
which the expenditure effect may lead to lower saving as tariffs go up. 
Our small open economy consists of two sectors - one that produces a good 
that can be used either for current consumption or for investment, and the 
other being a pure consumption good. The composite good is manufactured with 
labor and capital, while the pure consumption good uses labor and land in its 
production. This particular structure was chosen because it represents the 
simplest possible arrangement that allows a capital good to be produced and 
traded, and that allows international borrowing. 1 It is well known that.the 
more familiar two sector models in which labor and capital are used to produce 
both goods yield, in general, an indeterminate capital stock when foreign 
borrowing is permitted. 2 
The model is dynamic, since international borrowing is inherently not a 
static phenomenon. Furthermore, we examine the dynamics of the current 
account over an infinite span of time. Another approach would have been to 
look at a two-period model of the economy, but there are drawbacks to such a 
tact. It is impossible in the two-period world to distinguish between the 
short-run and long-run effects of policy changes. Also, the two-period view 
can be limiting when trying to study the dynamics of borrowing. A dollar 
borrowed today must be paid back with interest in that set-up. With an 
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infinite horizon, the principal on the loan never needs to be paid back - the 
present-value of the stream of interest payments equals the value of the 
principal. 
Since we wish to focus on the effect of tariffs on saving, we have 
assumed that there are no costs to adjusting the capital stock. Thus, the 
entire investment response occurs on impact when the tariff rates change. If 
the tariff is placed on the pure consumption good then production of that good 
expands, drawing labor out of the composite good sector. This lowers the 
marginal productivity of capital in that sector, thus making capital a less 
attractive asset than foreign bonds. Capital is immediately traded 
internationally for bonds until the marginal productivity of capital increases 
into equality with the world interest rate. If the tariff were levied on the 
composite good the opposite reaction would occur - there would be an immediate 
export of foreign bonds for capital. Thus, the impact effect from investment 
changes on the current account depends on which good the tariff is levied. 
Countries that are small in international capital markets, and in wh,ich 
individuals are infinitely lived and have constant discount rates, cannot 
reach a steady-state with non-zero wealth unless the knife-edge condition is 
met that the discount rate at home equals the world interest rate. The Yaari­
Blanchard model endogenizes the interest rate, in a sense which will be made 
clear later. The Uzawa-Obstfeld approach assumes the discount rate changes in 
response to changes in expenditure levels. Both models yield a saving 
equation near the steady-state that can be written as 
s = e(a - a)' 
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wheres is saving, a is tradeable a~sets {capital·plus bonds) and i is the 
steady-state level of a. Since a cannot change immediately when tariffs are 
imposed (capital can only be acquired through borrowing in the very short 
run), the effect on saving of a tariff is directly related to the effect on 
steady-state holdings of tradeable assets. The response of a to the tariff, 
however, may be very different in the two models. 
At this point it is worth emphasizing that we are interested only in the 
positive question of how tariffs affect the current account in a small 
economy, and do not examine welfare questions. 
Section 2 sets up the model and explores the effects of tariffs on 
investment. In section 3, the response of saving to a tariff on the pure 
consumption good is explored when consumers have Uzawa preferences, while the 
same issue is dealt with in section 4 under the assumption that consumers have 
uncertain lifetimes. Section. 5 takes up briefly the case of a tariff on the 
composite good. Conclusions are drawn in the final section. Much of the 
formal mathematics is included in an appendix. 
2. The Model 
There are two goods produced in our model - a pure consumption good and a 
composite good that can be consumed or used as an investment good. The 
composite good, which is labelled good 1, uses capital and labor in its 
production. The production function is assumed to be constant returns to 




where k is the stock of capital and xis the amount of labor employed in 
industry 1. Output in the second industry uses land and labor in its 
production, and the technology is again constant returns to scale. Labor is 
mobile between i-ndustries and it is assumed that the total labor supply as 
well as the total land stock are fixed at 1. We can write 
y = g(l - x) •2 
Capital depreciates at a rate n, so 
i = k - nk 
where i equals the rate of investment. 
The current account is equal to the trade surplus added to interest 
earned on holdings of foreign bonds. We have 
(1) b = rb - • , 
where bis domestic holdings of foreign assets,. is the trade deficit and r 
is the given world interest rate. This equation says that the current account 
surplus equals the rate of accumulation of foreign assets. 
For the economy as a whole 
6 
(2 ) y1 + PY 2 = z + i - • , 
where z is the value of total current consumption expenditure on the two goods 
(valued at world prices) by domestic residents, and pis the world price of 
good 2. This simply states that the value of output equals consumption plus 
investment less the trade deficit. (There is no government sector per se. 
Tariff revenue is redistributed back to consumers with lump-sum transfers.) 
It is convenient at this point to introduce the notation 
t - x/k • 
Competitive asset markets and the free mobility of capital internationally 
ensures that bonds and physical capital offer the same rate of return: 
The right side of the equation is the net marginal productivity of capital. 
For a given world rate of interest and depreciation rate this equation implies 
tis fixed over time. 
Since labor is mobile between sectors, the marginal productivity of labor 
will be equalized in the two industries: 
Here, pis the domestic price of good 2, which will differ from the world 
price if tariffs are in place. Except at the instant of a change in the 
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tariff rate, p does not change over time. Given that J. is fixed from eq. (3), 
the capital stock k will only change at the moment the tariff is altered. So, 
k = 0 , 
and 
i = nk • 
This country may be net importers of both goods, only one good or neither 
good at any point in time. From eq. (4) 
dk/dp = g1 /ipg 11 < 0 • 
If the tariff on the pure consumption good is increased, the capital stock 
falls. This occurs because production of good 2 increases, drawing labor out 
of sector 1 which is the capital-using industry. So, there is an incipient 
drop in the marginal productivity of capital. Disinvestment occurs as capital 
is traded for foreign bonds. If the tariff on the pure consumption good is 
lowered--or, equivalently, the tariff on the composite good is raised--the 
capital stock increases. 
We can see now that the direction of the investment effect on the current 
account of a change in the level of protection depends upon which good the 
tariff is levied. If the capital-using good is protected, investment 
increases and the current account falls. The current account balance will go 
up, on the other hand, if tariffs on the good that uses land and labor in its 
production are raised. 
'· 
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In this set-up the capital stock can change d1scretely. If investment is 
to occur over time there must be some rigidity that prevents the immediate 
adjustment of the stock of capital. A popular, though somewhat ad hoc, way of 
modelling this is to impose adjustment costs for both increasing and 
decreasing the capital stock. A more natural way of allowing gradual 
investment and disinvestment is to assume capital, once in place, cannot be 
moved. Disinvestment could take place only at the rate of depreciation. New 
investment could only occur as new capital goods are produced. A small 
country might reasonably be able to meet its capital needs in a very short 
period of time with capital imports, since its desired investment might be a 
small fraction of current production of capital goods. However, a large 
country could not increase its capital stock quickly since its desired 
investment might exceed current investment goods production. 
Another direction in which the model of investment could be altered is to 
allow a more general production structure. For example, we might allow all 
three factors to move between tndustries. In this case, if the elastici~ies 
of substitution between factors are equal in the two industries, then 
protection of a good will unambiguously lead to an increase (decrease) in the 
capital stock if that industry uses a larger (smaller) share of the country's 
capital stock than its share of the supply of labor or land. If there are 
more goods and factors, some weaker general results are available in Ruffin 
(1984) and the references cited therein. 
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3. Saving in the Uzawa-Obstfeld Model 
In this sector we will consider a model with a representative consumer 
who has Uzawa preferences. We will assume the pure consumption good is 
protected and look at the effects on saving of increasing the level of 
protection. 
At any moment in time, current felicity depends on consumption of both 
goods - u(c1, c2). It is convenient~ however, to express the level of 
felicity by the indirect utility function 
where I represents the level of expenditure at any given time, expressed in 
terms of domestic prices. 
A consumer maximizes the integral 
where 
t 
6.t = f 6 ds 
0 s 
and 6 is the instantaneous subjective discount rate at times. Followings 
Uzawa, we take o to be a function of utility at times: 
s 
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As in Uzawa, we assume 
o > o, o' > o, o - o'v > o, o" > o. 
Consumers choose their level of expenditure and the trade deficit subject 
to the constraints imposed by eq. (1) and the budget constraint 
( 5) 
where R is tariff revenue distributed to the individual. Consumers take Ras 
given and do not perceive that their choices alter its level. From eqs. (2) 
and (5) we see 
The aggregate model is s~own in the Appendix to be characterized by. 
saddle stability. Therefore, near the steady-state we have 
. 
b = el (b - b) , el > 0 
where -e1 is the negative eigenvalue of the dynamic system. Define tradeable 
assets a to be 
a = b + k • 
Since equation (4) tells us capital is fixed over time, k = r.:K. Thus, we can 
write 
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(6) b = e(a - a) • 
This is a particularly useful equation to analyze. It represents the 
accumulation of foreign bonds over time - i.e., the current account. The 
current account just equals saving, because all investment changes occur 
discretely at a point in time. 
The level of a is given to the economy at any given time. Capital can be 
traded for bonds, and vice-versa, but their sum can only change over time. 
-Thus, if tariffs are to affect saving it can only be through effects on a. 
According to equation (6), as irises so does saving and the current account. 
Given our assumptions on the mobility of international capital, any model 
of saving that has a stable steady-state will yield a saving equation such as 
(6) near the steady-state. However, different models of saving behavior may 
imply that the target level of traded assets a responds differently as tariffs 
are increased. 
From eqs. (1) and (2), we ·have that in steady-state when b = 0, 
Therefore, 
It is useful to look at the change in the two bracketed terms on the 
right side of eq. (7) separately. We would like to know how each term changes 
with an increase in tariffs. First let us note 
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= f (I) - ptg(l - x) 
= r + n + (p - p).t g ' ( 1 - x) • 
The last step uses eqs. (3) and (4). Remembering that i = nk, we then have 
= -[(p - p)_tg'(l - x)/r]dk/dp • 
This derivative is positive because p > p and dk/dp < O. 
We see that from the first term of eq. (7), steady-state holdings of 
traded assets must rise with an increase in the tariff on the pure consumption 
good. Intuitively, in order to maintain the same level of income in steady­
state after the tariff is imposed, the capital that is shipped abroad must be 
replaced by bonds. But, in fact, the economy needs to replace the capital 
with more than an equal amount of bonds to generate the same level of 
income. With a tariff already in place there was a distortion that caused the 
economy to have a lower capital stock than it would under free trade. An 
increase in the tariff worsens the distortion as it moves more resources to 
the protected sector. So, to maintain the same level of income, bonds must be 
imported not only to offset the lost capital but atso to counteract the 
a9gravation of the distortion. We call th1s effect on steady-state holdings 
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of b + k the distortion effect, and it causes a to rise with an increase in 
the tariff rate irrespective of the model of saving behavior. 
The second term in eq. (7) involves the steady-state level of 
expenditure, z. If consumers have the endogenous discount rate of Uzawa 
preferences, then over time expenditure adjusts so that in the steady state 
the discount rate equals the world rate of interest: 
o(v(I, p)) = r • 
The steady-state level of felicity is determined by this relationship, and 
will not change if a tariff is imposed. (Thus, all welfare loss from the 
imposition of a tariff comes along the transition to the steady-state, but not 
in the steady-state itself.) 
An increase in the tariff rate will raise the long-run level of 
expenditure at world prices. Figure 1 demonstrates this increa.se in 
Before the tariff,expenditure for a finite tariff starting from free trade. 
With thesteady-state consumption is at point a, and the expenditure is z. 
tariff, consumers set their marginal rate of substitution equal to the 
So, in order todomestic price given by the slope of the dotted line. 
maintain the same long-run felicity, expenditure rises to z'. This same point 
can be demonstrated mathematically by using properties of expediture 





Holding felicity constant 
= ( p - p) I22 > 0 • 
We see that steady-state expenditure rises when the tariff increases. 
Thus, in this model both the distortion effect and the expenditure effect 
contribute to higher saving as tariffs go up. In the next section, we will 
see that in the uncertain lifetime model steady-state expenditure falls with a 
raise in the tariff rate. 
4. Saving in the Yaari-Blanchard Model 
In this section we take up a model in which there is a continuum of 
agents, each of whom faces a constant probability of death~- At each instant 
of time a new cohort of size~ is born. The population is constant and has a 
size equal to 1. 
Each agent can own physical wealth in the form of bonds, capital or 
claims on land. Since these assets are perfect substitutes, they all earn the 
world rate of interest r. In addition, each agent is assumed to make a deal 
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with an insurance company that he receive an additional rate of return~ 
from the company if he lives, but that the company receive his physical wealth 
if he dies. Conversely, if the individual has net holdings of physical wealth 
less than zero, he agrees to pay a premium rate of~ per unit of debt on the 
condition the insurance company assumes his debt if he dies. The expected 
profit for the insurance company is zero. 
There are _two types of wealth that are assumed not transferable to the 
insurance company for an annuity. The individual 1 s human wealth (the 
discounted value of labor income) has no value upon death, so the insurance 
company is unwilling to pay anything to have the privilege of owning this 
asset after the person's death. Similarly, the individual has no claim on 
tariff revenue after death. Tariff revenue is distributed only to living 
persons, and not to anybody's estate. 
Individuals are assumed to maximize expected utility, which, given the 
constant probability of death implies they maximize 
They face the constraint 
(8) v1. = ( r + ~ )w. + f 1 (1) + R - I. 
1 1 1 
where wi is the value of n,on-human wealth owned by individual i. That is, 
(9) w = b + k +p(g - (1 - x)g'(l - x))/r. 
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The last term in eq. (9) represents the value of land. This can be seen by 
noting that the return to owning a unit of land is p(g - (1 - x)g'(l - x)) 
plus n times the value of a unit of land. 
We make an additional restriction on preferences in this section in order 
to be able to aggregate individual consumption into an aggregate consumption 
function. In particular, we assume that preferences are homothetic and can be 
written in constant relative risk aversion form: 
The Appendix shows that aggregate expenditure is proportional to wealth 
of all forms: 
where 
t = r + n: - (r - o)/r:J • 
Human wealth is given by f'(t)/(r + n). The term -(p - p)y2 is the sum of 
tariff revenue and z - I. It represents the cost to the individual of a 
tariff - he receives revenue R, but the price of good 2 is higher. 
For the types of wealth with which the individual cannot purchase an 
annuity, there is no difference between the rate of return for society and the 
individual. They might both be discounted at a rater+ n. So, we can say 
the value of these assets is [f'(t) - (p - p)y2JJ(r +n). The rate of return 
on these assets is simply f' (1) - (p - p)y 2• On the other hand, the rate of 
17 
return on physical wealth for society is only r. The -annuity payment 1t is 
merely a transfer from the insurance company to individuals. Thus, for 
society 
(11) W : rw + f I (J.) - (p - P)y2 - Z • 
This economy can reach a steady-state even though it faces a given world 
interest rate and has a constant discount rate. In a sense, the total rate of 
return on assets varies endogenously. The rate of return on physical wealth 
is rand on non-tangible assets r + 1t. The total return on the economy's 
portfolio is r + 1tA, where A is the share of wealth in non-tangible assets. 
As A changes over time, the economy-wide rate of return adjusts. 
If r <~then the system is saddle-stable, and 
Unlike the previous section, this equation holds globally (not just near the 
steady-state) because of our constant relative risk aversion assumption. Once 
again, we can write 
because the capital stock jumps immediately to its long run value. So, the 
tariff will raise the current account if it causes a to jump up •. 
Eqs. (2), (3), (4), (5) and (9) can be used to show that the asset 
accumulation equation (11) above is equi va1 ent to eq. (1). Thus, there is no 
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difference from the previous section·in the expression for the long-run level 
of traded assets 
As before, the distortion effect will imply an increase in the tariff and will 
cause a to go up. 
Steady-state expenditures can be derived from eqs. (10) and (11) when 
~ = O. These expenditures are simply proportional to the value of what we 
have called non-tangible assets: 
In this model, long run expenditures fall as the tariff is increased: 
dz/dp = [t:.1t (t:. - r )( r + 1t) J[1 (p - p) g 1 ~ - g] • 
dp 
Here, at any point in time consumption is proportional to wealth - much as in 
a permanent income model. The steady-state requires that w be proportional to 
non-tangible assets, which in turn implies steady-state consumption 
expenditures are proportional to the value of non-tangible assets. Since the 
value of these assets falls with a tariff, so does long-run expenditure. 
So, in the Yaari-Blanchard world of uncertain lifetimes and a constant 
discount rate, the distortion and expenditure effects of a change in tariffs 
work in opposite directions on the current account. The expenditure effect 
may in fact dominate the distortion effect, so higher tariffs could cause a 
decrease in the current account balance. 
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5. Tariffs on the Composite Good 
In this section we will briefly trace through the effects of a tariff on 
the composite good. The results are not too different from the previous 
section. The only change is that in the Yaari-Blanchard model the sign of the 
expenditure effect is indeterminate. 
It is useful in this section to change numeraires so that expenditure 
levels are expressed in terms of the pure consumption good. So, we now have 
{ 12) z = PY l + y2 + P't - pi 
and 
We will also express the value of bonds and the current account in terms of 
good 2: 
. 
(14) b = rb + pyl + y2 - z - pi 
This implies that in steady-state, when b = 0, long-run bond holdings are 
given by 
We now write the labor market equilibrium as: pf'(J.) = g'(l - kJ.). 
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Both models are saddle-stable again, under the same set•of assumptions. 
So, foreign bond accumulation can once again be expressed as 
b = e(b - b) , e > 0 • 
The capital stock will equal its long-run value at all times, so 
(15) b = e(a - a) , 
where 
a= b + pk • 
It follows that the tariff will affect saving only to the extent it influences 
a. The steady-state level of a is given by 
(16) a= [pk+ (pi - py1 - y2)/r] + [z/r] • 
Taking the change in the term in the first bracket in eq. (16) will yield 
the distortion effect. It is again positive, so that higher tariffs tend to 
lead to h~gher levels of i, and a higher current balance, through this 
channel. 
= [(p - p}J.f 1 (1)/r]dk/dp. 
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This derivative is greater than zero ~ecause p > p and dk/dp > O. 
In the model with Uzawa preferences, the increase in tariffs again leads 
to a higher steady-state expenditure level. The current account rises from 
both the distortion effect and the expenditure effect. Formally, the long-run 
felicity level is determined by the condition 
o(v(I, p)) = r. 
Now, let us define 
Then 
Holding felicity constant 
= (p - p)Ill > 0 • 
In the uncertain lifetime formulation, aggregate expenditure is given by 
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where 
(18) w = b +pk+ (g - (1 - ik))g')/r. 
Human wealth is given by pf'(i)/(r + ~). The term (p - p)(i - y1) again 
represents the change in the individual consumer's income from the tariff, 
equalling the sum of tariff revenue and z - I. 
Saving is given by the relation 
(19) w = rw + pf'(i) + (p - p)(i - y1) - z • 
Eqs. (12), (13) and (18) can be used to show that equation (19) is identical 
to eq. (14). Thus, eq. (16) gives the steady-state holdings of a in this 
model. 
We can use eqs. (18) and (19) to solve for long run consumption 
expenditures: 
-The change in z from an increase in the tariff on the composite good is given 
by: 
23 
dz/dp = [cm/(tl - r)(r + rc)][(p - p)(n - f(J.)) dk 
dp 
- (kf(i) - f'(t) - nk)] •. 
The first tenn in the second bracket is negative because f(t) >non the 
assumption that the world interest rate is positive. This means the entire 
expression for dz/dp is less than zero if (kf(t) - f'(t) - nk) is positive. 
This condition will be met if capital 1 s income exceeds the income of labor 
employed in the consumption goods sector. 
The expenditure effect on steady-state traded asset holdings can be 
negative (though it need not be). If it is negative, it may outweigh the 
distortion effect. So, once again in the uncertain lifetime model raising 
tariffs may lower the current account balance. 
6. Conclusions 
We have examined in this paper how the current account responds to 
increases in the level of protection, according to two popular models for 
small economies that can borrow·intjrnationally. The two models--the Uzawa­
Obstfeld endogenous time preference set-up and the Yaari-Blanchard uncertain 
lifetime formulation--have much in common. Both assume consumers have 
foresight and optimize; and both, under the proper set of assumptions, 
describe economies that converge to a steady-state. Yet, the reaction of the 
current account to tariff changes can be quite dissimilar in these models. 
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This conclusion is of practical importance. There is increasing use in 
the profession of general equilibrium models for small less developed 
countries to try to give answers to policy questions. These models are 
empirically based, and some (such as Kharas and Shishido (1985), and Ghanem 
(1985)) have allowed intertemporal optimization. A lesson of this paper is 
that some policy conclusions drawn about the effects of tariffs might be quite 
sensitive to the structure of the model. It is necessary to know whether 
savers have a target level of long-run welfare or whether their expenditure 
levels are just proportional to permanent income. 
Although in some ways the models studied in this paper are limited, the 
structure is rich enough to highlight the usefulness of the dynamic 
intertemporal approach to .current account analysis. The effect on saving of 
higher tariffs is seen to depend on matters that are not at all relevant in 
static or two-period models. The impact of the tariff on the steady-state 
levels of income and consumption through the distortion effect and the 
expenditure effect are of primary importance. 
Footnotes 
1. This model of the production side was used, for example~ by Eaton (1984a, 
1984b) to study various dynamic trade issues. 
2. See, for example, Mundell (1957). 
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